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United States v. Alaska-Proof of sovereignty exercised by
Alaska over Cook Inlet was insufficient to establish the inlet as
an historic bay and thus the United States, as against Alaska, has
rights to the oil and gas lands beneath the lower portion of the
inlet.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial areas of international law since
the end of World War II has been the freedom of the seas. Histori-
cally, the use of the high seas has been reserved for the com-
munity of nations, with States maintaining jurisdiction over
areas adjacent to their coasts.' However, the emergence of tech-
nology for exploitation of the continental shelf has led to the
expansion of claims to the sea and to the seabed.2
The continental shelf of the United States presents unique
problems. Not only must the federal government assert sover-
eignty over the continental shelf as against other nations, but its
claims are also limited by claims of individual states, which have
paramount rights to the seabed and resources beneath inland
waters .
3
In United States v. Alaska,4 the Supreme Court considered
whether Cook Inlet could be properly characterized as an historic
bay and, therefore, as inland waters of Alaska. The decision of the
Court that the inlet was not an historic bay clarified the proof
necessary to establish historic title. The decision must also be
viewed in light of its ultimate effect-the granting of immense
reserves of oil and gas to the United States Government.
I. BACKGROUND
Cook Inlet is a body of water which creates a large indenta-
tion in the Alaska coastline. It is more than one hundred fifty
miles long and its headlands at Cape Douglas, its natural
entrance, are more than twenty-four miles apart.' In April, 1967,
Alaska offered a tract of submerged lands in lower Cook Inlet for
1. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 1-2 (1962).
2. Id. at 636-37.
3. See Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1970).
4. 422 U.S. 184 (1975).
5. Id. at 185-86. Cook Inlet is approximately equal in size to Lake Erie. Id. at 185
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a competitive oil and gas lease sale.' The lands to be leased were
situated more than three miles both from the shore of Cook Inlet
and from a line drawn across the inlet at Kalgin Island, where the
headlands are about twenty-four miles apart.' Therefore, the
lands would not come within the lands granted to a state by the
provisions of the Submerged Lands Act unless the inlet were to
be characterized as an historic bay.8 One month after the land
was offered for lease, the United States brought suit in the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Alaska to quiet title and for injunc-
tive relief. The federal government contended that the waters
seaward of a point three miles below Kalgin Island constituted
high seas, and that therefore the submerged lands for which
leases were to be negotiated were subject to the sovereignty of the
United States. Alaska argued that Cook Inlet in its entirety was
an historic bay and therefore the waters were inland waters sub-
ject to the exclusive sovereignty of the state of Alaska. The dis-
trict court held for Alaska,9 and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed."0 "[B]ecause of the importance of the
litigation and because the case presented a substantial question
concerning the proof necessary to establish a body of water as a
historic bay,"" the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
6. Id. at 186.
7. Id.
8. The upper portion of Cook Inlet, landward of the Kalgin Island line where the in-
let is twenty-four miles wide is inland waters as defined by the Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Mar. 24, 1961, art. 7, para. 4, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S.
No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea
Convention]. For the text of paragraph 4, see note 37 infra. Pursuant to the Submerged
Lands Act, Alaska has title to the inlet only as far as three miles seaward of this line if
the inlet is not established as an historic bay. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1970).
9. 352 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1972). The Supreme Court commented that this case
appeared to qualify for its original jurisdiction under Art. III, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution,
and that it was "not enlightened as to why the United States chose not to bring an original
action in this Court." 422 U.S. at 186 n.2. In fact, this is the first of the major submerged
lands cases where an original action was not brought in the Supreme Court.
10. 497 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). The court reaffirmed the Supreme
Court's reasoning in United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969), that since the concept
of the historic bay was relatively imprecise, the issues were priiharily factual. Therefore,
the findings of the district court would have to be affirmed unless the inferences dragon
from the testimony received and the voluminous documents examined were clearly erro-
neous. 497 F.2d at 1157.
11. 422 U.S. at 187.
12. 419 U.S. 1045 (1974).
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II. THE DELIMITATION OF THE SEA
In order to understand the basis for the determination of this
issue, the term historic bay must be examined in the context of
the United States Submerged Lands Act'" and in light of defini-
tions of the territorial sea, the high seas, and the continental
shelf. The territorial sea denotes waters adjacent to the coast of
a State. 4 Historically, territorial waters extended three miles
from the low water mark of the coast.'5 In recent years, many
coastal States have claimed larger areas, in some instances up to
two hundred miles. 6 However, as yet there is no internationally
recognized standard for the delimitation of the territorial sea. 7 As
defined by the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone [hereinafter referred to as the Territorial Sea
Convention], sovereignty over the territorial sea includes sover-
eignty over the water itself as well as over the air space above and
the bed and subsoil below.'" The only limitation on this sover-
eignty is that the coastal State must allow the innocent passage
of foreign vessels through the territorial waters.'"
Beyond the territorial sea lie the high seas, which are not
subject to the sovereignty of any State. "No part of the open sea
13. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1970).
14. Territorial Sea Convention at art. 1.
15. The notion of the three-mile territorial sea developed in the seventeenth century,
as a result of either economic considerations or military needs. The "cannon-shot rule,"
the original basis for the three-mile limit in Europe, delimited the territorial sea by the
range of a cannon shot from the shore. It was most likely started by the Dutch during a
fishing dispute with Great Britain in 1610. The Scandinavian countries, on the other hand,
asserted sovereignty by a measured distance, as when Denmark reserved to its citizens a
belt two leagues off the coast of Iceland to use for fishing purposes. Eventually the cannon-
shot rule and the measured widths merged, and the three-mile territorial sea became a
standard limit of sovereignty asserted by a nation. Kent, The Historical Origins of the
Three-Mile Limit, 48 Am. J. INT'L L. 537, 538-39 (1954).
16. R. & B. SMETHERMAN, TERRITORIAL SEAS AND INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS 4-10
(1974); Nweihed, Venezuela's Contribution to the Contemporary Law of the Sea, 11 SAN
DIECO L. REV. 603, 621-23 (1974).
17. The International Law Commission, in its final report before the 1958 Vienna
Conference on the Law of the Sea, failed to agree to a standard width. The Commission,
however, went on record as stating that "international law did not permit" an extension
of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles. Report of the International Law Commission,
11 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956). The Vienna Conference also
refused to set a standard. In addition to a lack of conventional agreement, the great
diversity of claims, ranging from three miles to two hundred miles, makes it impossible
to derive customary law on the subject.
18. Territorial Sea Convention at art. 2.
19. Territorial Sea Convention at art. 14; P. JESsUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS
AND MARITIME JURISDICTION xxxiv (1927).
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is allowed by international law to be subjected to the exclusive
domination by one State, to become the exclusive sphere of valid-
ity of one national legal order, to become the territory of a State
in the narrower sense."' " Thus, while a nation may exercise al-
most total sovereignty over its territorial sea, it may assert no
claim to the waters beyond the territorial limit. 2' However, the
lands lying beneath the sea beyond the territorial sea may be
subject to sovereignty exercised pursuant to the definition of the
continental shelf.
Geologically, the continental shelf consists of "the zone
around the continent extending from the low water line to a depth
at which there is usually a marked declivity to greater depth. '22
The Convention on the Continental Shelf" has expanded this
definition, referring to the continental shelf as "the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside
the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond
that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits
of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas. '24
This definition has given rise to some controversy because its
exploitability criterion could conceivably lead to indefinite ex-
pansion of the shelf.2 However, it is recognized that a coastal
State has the right to explore and exploit the natural resources
lying on its continental shelf.28 This right is exclusive unless the
20. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 211 (1949); Convention on the
High Seas, Mar. 24, 1961, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82
(effective Sept. 30, 1962).
21. Article 24(1) of the Territorial Sea Convention, however, established a zone con-
tiguous to the territorial sea in which the coastal State may exercise control when neces-
sary to compel compliance with its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary regulations
and to punish infringement of these regulations. Section (2) provides that the "contiguous
zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured."
22. 2 A. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 342 (1962).
23. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 24, 1961, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf
Convention].
24. Id. at art. 1 (emphasis added).
25. F. NOLAND, A CASE FOR AN "INTERNATIONAL REGIME" FOR THE SEABEDS 10 (1971).
One scholar has labeled Article 1 as "one of the most disastrous clauses ever inserted in a
treaty of vital importance to mankind." Friedmann, Selden Redivivus-Towards a Parti-
tion of the Seas?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 757 (1971). See generally B. OXIIAN, THE PREPARATION
OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (1968); Finlay, The Outer
Limit of the Continental Shelf, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 42 (1970); Henkin, International Law
and "the Interests": The Law of the Seabed, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 504 (1969).
26. Continental Shelf Convention at art. 2.
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coastal State expressly authorizes another nation to undertake
the exploitation of the shelf.2" The geological continental shelf of
the United States extends out from the coast approximately two
hundred miles, 28 and the shelf off Alaska encompasses about
600,000 square miles, an area almost the size of Alaska itself.2"
While it is clear that international law grants to the United States
sovereignty over the continental shelf as against other nations, a
municipal law problem arises over rights to the resources of the
seabed as between the federal government and the individual
states.
The determination of sovereignty over submerged lands has
been a congressional and judicial issue since 1947, when the Su-
preme Court concluded that rights to subsurface resources be-
neath the three-mile territorial sea were vested exclusively in the
United States." In response to that holding, 31 Congress enacted
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953.3 The Act granted to the states
title and rights to the resources of submerged lands within three
miles of their coastlines. 3 The term "coastline" was defined as
including not only land delineations, but also "the seaward limit
of inland waters. ' 34 The term "inland waters," however, was not
27. Id.
28. H.R. REP. No. 215, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1953).
29. Id.
30. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
31. The Supreme Court's holding in United States v. California was widely criticized.
The House Committee on the Judiciary, in reporting on a predecessor bill to the Sub-
merged Lands Act, stated that it was "of the opinion that no decision of the Supreme
Court in many years has caused such dissatisfaction, confusion, and protest as the Califor-
nia case." H.R. REP. No. 1778, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1948).
32. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1970).
33. It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1) title
to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries
of the respective States, and the natural resources within such lands and waters,
and (2) the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the
said lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable State law be,
and they are, subject to the provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed, estab-
lished, and vested in and assigned to the respective States ....
43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1970).
The term "boundaries" includes the seaward boundaries of a State. . . as they
existed at the time such State became a member of the Union . . .but in no
event shall the term "boundaries" or the term "lands beneath navigable waters"
be interpreted as extending from the coast line more than three geographical
miles into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean . . ..
43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1970).
34. "The term 'coast line' means the line of ordinary low water along that portion of
the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward
limit of inland waters." 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1970).
1976] CASE COMMENTS
defined in the Act. 5
In United States v. California,36 a 1965 case in which the
Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether seven bays
in California could be considered inland waters, the Court de-
cided that the definitions provided in the Territorial Sea Conven-
tion31 should be adopted in construing the Submerged Lands Act.
Under Article 7 of the Convention, if the entrance points of a bay
are twenty-four miles apart or less, the bay can be considered
inland waters; if the bay has natural entrance points separated
by more than twenty-four miles, the waters can be considered
inland only if the bay is designated an historic bay. Although the
Convention did not define historic bay, recognition of historic
waters has been a part of customary international law.38 The
California Court, however, did state that an historic bay is a bay
"over which a coastal nation has traditionally asserted and main-
tained dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations." 9
It was not until 1969 that the Supreme Court, in United
States v. Louisiana [hereinafter referred to as Louisiana
Boundary],"° indicated that at least three factors are significant
in determining whether a maritime area is an historic bay. These
factors, promulgated in an International Law Commission study,
35. An early version of the bill which became the Submerged Lands Act defined
inland waters to include "all estuaries, ports, harbors, bays, channels, straits, historic
bays, and sounds, and all other bodies of water which join the open sea." S. REP. No. 133,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1953). The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
removed this definition. "By deleting the original definition of 'inland waters' Congress
made plain its intent to leave the meaning of the term to be elaborated by the courts,
independently of the Submerged Lands Act." United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139,
150-51 (1965).
36. 381 U.S. 139 (1965).
37. Territorial Sea Convention at art. 7 provides:
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points
of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between
these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered
as internal waters.
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance
points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four
miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maxi-
mum area of water that is possible with a line of that length.
6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or in
any case where the straight baseline system provided for in article 4 is applied.
38. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 170-71 (1973); JESSUP,
supra note 19, at 362-63; McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 341-73; 1 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 505-08 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
39. 381 U.S. at 172.
40. 394 U.S. 11, 23-24 n.27, 75 (1969).
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Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays
[hereinafter referred to as Juridical Regime],4 are: "(1) the exer-
cise of authority over the area by the State claiming the historic
right; (2) the continuity of this exercise of authority; (3) the atti-
tude of foreign States."4 The Court in Louisiana Boundary
adopted these criteria in resolving a domestic controversy be-
cause it recognized that a claim to historic waters made by a state
government could be a valid assertion of dominion as against
other nations.4 3 The Court, therefore, "treat[ed] the claim of
historic waters as if it were being made by the national sovereign
and opposed by another nation.""
The concept of historic waters developed from the necessity
of recognizing a State's usage of maritime areas, even if the area
were not part of the State's territorial sea.45 Without this concept,
the delimitation of the sea into inland waters, territorial seas, and
high seas would have conflicted with existing claims to the sea.
Therefore, such delimitations would not have been accepted by
States whose claims over the ocean were adversely affected."
However, while States and commentators recognize the need for
the concept of historic waters, there is dispute as to the nature of
historic title. Some commentators47 are of the opinion that a
claim to historic waters is an exception to principles of interna-
tional law because a State, through historic title, can claim as
inland waters part of the ocean that would otherwise be consid-
ered high seas.
The acquisition by historic title is "adverse acquisition," akin
to acquisition by prescription, in other words, title to "historic
waters" is obtained by a process through which the originally
lawful owners, the community of States, are replaced by the
coastal State. Title to "historic waters", therefore, has its origin
in an illegal situation which was subsequently validated. This
validation could not take place by the mere passage of time; it
41. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, [1962] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/143 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Juridical Regime].
42. Id. at 13.
43. 394 U.S. at 76 & n.103.
44. Id. at 77.
45. Juridical Regime at 6-7.
46. Id. at 7.
47. 3 G. GIDEL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 532-593 (1934), cited in Juridi-
cal Regime at 6-8; Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice, 1951-54: General Principles and Sources, 30 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1953), cited in
Juridical Regime at 8.
[Vol. 1I.:2
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must be consummated by the acquiescence of the rightful own-
ers. 
4
Thus, those States and commentators who are in accord with the
concept of historic waters as an exception to international law
require that other nations acquiesce in the claim of the coastal
State.49
Other commentators deny the existence of the rigid delimita-
tion of the sea. 0 They are of the opinion that the claim to historic
waters is not an exception to generally accepted rules, since they
dispute the existence of such rules. Consequently, these commen-
tators state that explicit acquiescence is not required for a valid
claim to historic waters; mere "absence of any reaction by foreign
States is sufficient."
51
The United States appears to have adopted the view that
historic claims constitute an exception to international law.
Following the Supreme Court's 1947 decision in United States v.
California,2 a Special Master was appointed to determine which
of certain disputed bodies of water were inland waters. In his
report, the Special Master assumed that it was the federal
government's position that according to international law, bays
with headlands ten miles or less apart were inland waters, and
those with headlands more than ten miles apart were interna-
tional waters unless such bays were claimed as historic bays.-3
By referring to the specific delimitation of the entrance to a bay,
the Special Master implicitly recognized and adopted the view
that an historic bay is an exception to international law. The
Court, in the 1965 United States v. California case, approved the
Special Master's report, thus adopting the "exceptional" concept
of historic bays. 4
48. Juridical Regime at 16.
49. See id. for a discussion of the logical problem raised by acquiescence.
50. Bourquin, Les baies historiques, MELANGES GEORGES SAUSER-HALL 37-51 (1952),
cited in Juridical Regime at 9.
51. Bourquin, supra note 50, at 46, cited in Juridical Regime at 16. For a treatment
of the opposing views of historic waters see Fisheries Case (United Kingdom-Norway),
[1951] I.C.J. 116, in which the United Kingdom asserted the view that historic waters
are an exception to international law and Norway argued to the contrary.
52. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
53. Special Master's Report, No. 6, Original, Oct. Term, 1952, quoted in 1 A.
SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 329 (1962).
54. 381 U.S. 139. The Court, however, apparently misread the Special Master's report
with respect to the status of historic bays as an exception to international law. In response
to California's assertion that the Special Master erroneously thought the concept of his-
1976]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
Once it is acknowledged that historic title is an "excep-
tional" title, however, there remains dispute as to the type of
acquiescence required for the title to ripen. Logically,
acquiescence implies a form of explicit consent. 5 Nevertheless,
some commentators who support the "exceptional" view assert
that mere toleration, that is, the absence of opposition, is suffi-
cient to establish valid title." It is interesting to note that accept-
ing the requirement of mere toleration, rather than explicit ac-
quiescence, brings adherents of the "exceptional" theory closer
to the adherents of the theory that historic title is not an excep-
tion to international law: both come to the same conclusion that
the only acquiescence needed is the lack of any opposition by
foreign States.
III. EVIDENCE OF SOVEREIGNTY
In deciding whether Cook Inlet could qualify as an historic
bay, the Supreme Court, utilizing the International Law Com-
mission study as a general guideline, examined the exercise of
sovereignty over lower Cook Inlet in three time periods: the Rus-
sian period, the United States period, and the period of Alaskan
statehood. If the authority exercised during any one of these three
periods was sufficient to establish the inlet as an historic bay, the
claim to historic waters would be currently valid. Once in exist-
ence, historic title cannot be divested by later opposition."
In considering the evidence of authority exercised over Cook
Inlet, the district court had concluded that there were three facts
indicating Russian sovereignty over the lower portion of the inlet:
(1) the existence of four Russian settlements on the shores of Cook
Inlet; (2) the firing by a Russian fur trader on a British ship that
tried to enter the inlet around 1768; and (3) an 1821 ukase by Czar
Alexander I excluding foreign vessels within one hundred miles
of the Alaska coastline.-8
toric waters to be an exception to the general rule, the Court stated that it found "no
substantial indication of this [concept] in his report." Id. at 174. Yet by adopting the
report, the Court implicity adopted that very concept of historic waters.
55. Juridical Regime at 16.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 18.
58. The Supreme Court explained that "[t]he reported opinion of the District Court
did not discuss the exercise of sovereignty prior to 1906, but the unreported findings
indicate that the court relied on assertions of authority dating from Russian territorial
times as well as the early American period." 422 U.S. at 190 n.9.
[Vol. 11:2
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The Supreme Court dealt with this evidence summarily. It
stated that the existence of the four Russian settlements estab-
lished no claim to the lower portion of the inlet." Secondly, the
Court attached little legal significance to the fur trader's firing on
the British ship because there was no indication that the fur
trader was acting with governmental authority rather than as a
private citizen. 0 In any case, the Court pointed out, the firing
could be viewed as an assertion of sovereignty only over the three-
mile territorial limit covered by the range of the cannon shot."
Finally, the fact that the Czar's ukase was unequivocally with-
drawn because of protests from the United States and England
indicated that there was no acquiescence to his claim by other
nations.2 The Court therefore concluded that during the period
of Russian sovereignty there was not sufficient exercise of sover-
eignty over lower Cook Inlet to justify a finding of historic bay
status.
In considering the second period of sovereignty, when Alaska
was a territory of the United States (1867-1959), the Court exam-
ined five documents which the district court had relied upon in
finding that the federal government had continuously exercised
authority over all the waters constituting the inlet: three federal
statutes, 3 a map of waters covered by United States fishing regu-
lations, 4 and an executive order concerning fishing regulations. 5
Only one of the statutes6 differentiated between American na-
tionals and foreigners, but that statute was never enforced in
lower Cook Inlet. 7 The other two statutes were enforced in the
59. Id. at 190. "The presence of early Russian settlements on the shores of Cook Inlet
certainly demonstrates the existence of a claim to the land, but it gives little indication
of the authority Russia may have exerted over the vast expanse of waters that constitutes
the inlet." Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 191. See Juridical Regime at 14-15.
In the first place the acts [asserting sovereignty] must emanate from the State
or its organs. Acts of private individuals would not be sufficient-unless, in
exceptional circumstances, they might be considered as ultimately expressing
the authority of the State.
Juridical Regime at 14-15.
61. 422 U.S. at 191. See note 15 supra.
62. 422 U.S. at 191-92.
63. Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 241, as codified, Rev. Stat. § 1956 (1878); Alien
Fishing Act, ch. 3299, 34 Stat. 263 (1906); White Act, ch. 272, 43 Stat. 464 (1924).
64. Gharrett-Scudder Line, discussed in 422 U.S. at 194-96.
65. Exec. Order No. 3752 (Nov. 3, 1922).
66. Alien Fishing Act, ch. 3299, 34 Stat. 263 (1906).
67. 422 U.S. at 193 & n.15.
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lower portion of the inlet, but only against Americans. The map
had been drawn in connection with discussions between the
United States and Canada concerning the control of salmon fish-
ing in the high seas of the North Pacific, and it delineated the
area governed by Alaska fishing regulations. However, the map
had been transmitted to Canadian representatives with "ex-
press disclaimers that the line was intended to bear any rela-
tionship to the territorial waters of the United States in a legal
sense.""
The last document, the executive order, created a fisheries
reservation and specifically embraced all of Cook Inlet. The Su-
preme Court, however, rejected the contention that the creation
or enforcement of fishing regulations was sufficient to establish
historic title to Cook Inlet. It referred to its previous decision in
Louisiana Boundary, which recognized that the nature of the
control resulting from the exercise of authority must be commen-
surate with the type of authority actually exercised. 9 Inland wa-
ters are subject to the contiguous State's complete sovereignty,
"as much as if they were a part of its land territory."7 The Court
determined in Louisiana Boundary that the enforcement of navi-
gation regulations was an incident of territorial waters, rather
than of inland waters, because the innocent passage of foreign
vessels was not prohibited.7' For sovereignty to have been exer-
cised commensurate with a claim to inland waters, all foreign
vessels and navigation would have to have been excluded. There-
fore, since Lousiana had not treated the waters in question as
inland waters, it could not claim them as historic."
In following its decision in Louisiana Boundary, the Court in
the instant case reiterated the necessity for Alaska to have
treated Cook Inlet as inland waters in order to establish the inlet
as an historic bay. The Court found that "[tihe enforcement of
fishing and wildlife regulations, as found and relied upon by the
District Court, was patently insufficient in scope to establish his-
toric title to Cook Inlet as inland waters."73 The decision appears
to be consistent with customary and conventional international
law, which recognize the enforcement of fishing regulations in the
68. Id. at 196.
69. 394 U.S. at 24-26. See also Juridical Regime at 23.
70. 394 U.S. at 22.
71. Id. at 24-26. See text accompanying note 19 supra.




territorial sea and even in the high seas.74 Several of the claims
by nations to a wider territorial sea have been based upon the
need to preserve fishery resources or to allow local fishermen ex-
clusive access to larger portions of the ocean. 75 The United Na-
tions Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas76 provides that
[a] State whose nationals are engaged in fishing in any area of
the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea of a coastal State
shall, at the request of that coastal State, enter into negotiations
with a view to prescribing by agreement the measures necessary
for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas in
that area.7"
Thus, the fact that Alaska enforced fishing regulations or
created a fisheries reservation in Cook Inlet was insufficient to
establish a claim to inland waters because, according to interna-
tional law, such regulations are incidents of sovereignty exercised
over the territorial sea and the high seas, rather than over inland
waters.
The third period of sovereignty over Cook Inlet considered by
the Supreme Court was the period-from 1959 when Alaska be-
came a state, to 1967 when the present suit was initiated. The
most significant event of that period, aside from continuing en-
forcement of fishing regulations, was the 1962 arrest of a Japanese
fleet in the Shelikof Strait, about seventy-five miles from the
lower portion of the inlet. The Supreme Court recognized that the
arrest manifested a determination to exclude foreign vessels en-
tirely from the inlet-an exercise of authority commensurate in
scope with sovereignty over inland waters." Since the incident
could potentially establish historic title over inland waters, the
Court carefully analyzed the seizure of the Japanese fleet.
The facts of the incident were not disputed either by the
United States or by Alaska. Early in 1962, a private commercial
fishing enterprise in Japan announced its intention to send a
74. JESSUP, supra note 19, at 11-211 passim; McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at
453-1078 passim; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, Mar. 24, 1961, art. 6, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285
(effective Mar. 20, 1966).
75, McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 453-82.
76. 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
77. Id. at art. 6.
78. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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fishing fleet into the waters of the Shelikof Strait and into Cook
Inlet. The United States took no action with regard to the pro-
posed intrusion. Six Japanese vessels thereafter sailed into the
lower portion of Cook Inlet, remaining for one day. They subse-
quently left the inlet and sailed southwest into the Shelikof
Strait, where they fished for ten days undisturbed. At that point,
Alaskan officials boarded two of the vessels, arrested three of the
fleet's captains, and charged them with violating Alaskan fishing
regulations pertaining to the Shelikof Strait. The private Japa-
nese company and the state of Alaska entered into an agreement
whereby the officers were released in exchange for a promise
that the company would not fish in the inlet or the strait pending
judicial resolution of Alaska's jurisdiction over the area. The
Japanese Government did not approve of the agreement, how-
ever, and lodged a protest with the United States Government.
The United States refused. to take an official position on the
matter, and judicial proceedings were dismissed without reaching
any conclusion as to Alaskan jurisdiction over the strait or the
inlet.79
The district court viewed the incident as an assertion of sov-
ereignty over all the waters of Cook Inlet5 0 The Supreme Court,
however, stated that the seizure of the fleet was an assertion of
sovereignty, "if at all," only over the waters of the Shelikof
Strait.8 It pointed out that Alaskan authorities allowed the ves-
sels to enter Cook Inlet and took no action during the time the
fleet remained in the inlet. The officers of the fleet were arrested
only after they had left the inlet and were fishing seventy-five
miles southwest of the nearest portion of the inlet. Moreover, the
charges filed against the captains concerned only the intrusion
into the strait, rather than the entry into the inlet. The seizure
of the vessels thus did not constitute an assertion of sovereignty
over the waters of Cook Inlet, but only over the Shelikof Strait.
The Supreme Court, assuming arguendo an assertion of sov-
ereignty over the inlet as well as over the strait, considered the
Japanese Government's attitude towards Alaska's seizure of the
fleet. The attitude of a foreign nation is measured in terms of its
acquiescence to a coastal State's claim of historic title.82 The
79. 422 U.S. at 201-02.
80. 352 F. Supp. at 821.
81. 422 U.S. at 202.
82. Juridical Regime at 16. For a full discussion of acquiescence see text accompany-
ing notes 55 & 56 supra.
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district court interpreted the fact that Japanese fishing vessels
did not return to the waters claimed by Alaska as recognition of
Alaskan sovereignty over the waters in question. 3 The Supreme
Court, however, adopted the more stringent view of acquiescence,
requiring that "something more than the mere failure to object
must be shown. 84 Despite Japan's tacit recognition of Alaskan
sovereignty over the waters,8 5 the Court held that such
acquiescence was not sufficient to establish historic title to Cook
Inlet.
Thus, after reviewing the three periods during which author-
ity was exerted over Cook Inlet, the Supreme Court found that,
in each period, the authority exercised was insufficient to estab-
lish sovereignty over inland waters. As a result, Cook Inlet could
not be characterized as an historic bay.
IV. FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The United States, in the course of the Alaska case, had filed
disclaimers of sovereignty over the waters of lower Cook Inlet, and
had alleged that a decision "upholding historic title substantially
would interfere with the conduct of foreign relations by the Exec-
utive branch of the government." 8 According to the Supreme
Court, the district court rejected these disclaimers "on the
grounds that they were ill-advised and, perhaps, self-serving.""
Although the Supreme Court stated that it was not necessary to
determine whether the disclaimers could have defeated otherwise
sufficient facts since it had found there was insufficient evidence
to establish historic title,88 the significance of the disclaimers was
their origin in the foreign policy needs which impelled the United
States to bring the suit.88
83. 352 F. Supp. at 821.
84. 422 U.S. at 200.
85. Id. at 203. It is true that, as the Court pointed out, the formal agreement to
respect Alaskan sovereignty over the inlet was entered into by a private company, rather
than by the Japanese Government, and therefore the Japanese Government could not be
bound by the agreement. See note 60 supra. However, the fact that neither public nor
private Japanese vessels returned to waters claimed by Alaska can be interpreted as tacit
recognition by the Japanese Government of Alaska's claim of sovereignty over Cook Inlet.
86. 352 F. Supp. at 821.
87. 422 U.S. at 203-04 n.17.
88. Id.
89. See generally R. MANCKE, THE FAILURE OF U.S. ENERGY POLICY (1974); THE Eco-
NOMIC CRIsIs READER (D. Mermelstein ed. 1975); J. RIDGEWAY & B. CONNER, NEW ENERGY
(1975); M. TANZER, THE ENERGY CRISIS: WORLD STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND WEALTH (1975).
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The claim of the United States that Cook Inlet is important
to the government for foreign policy reasons seems indisputable
in light of the immense oil reserves in the seabed of the inlet. This
area and the Prudhoe Bay region in the north" are the two major
potential oil-producing areas in Alaska. In 1970, the state had
10,149,000,000 barrels of proved reserves of crude petroleum, and
only 202 producing oil wells. Texas, by comparison, had
13,195,000,000 barrels of proved reserves with 177,221 producing
wells.9 1 The urgency of the United States claim is underscored by
the fact that the search for petroleum under the sea has intensi-
fied in recent years. In 1972, offshore exploration was being con-
ducted on the continental shelves of eighty countries, including
the United States, and involved one hundred thirty-four compa-
nies.
The need for domestic sources of oil was the motivation be-
hind the passage of the Submerged Lands Act in 1953.13 The
legislative history of the Act reveals that litigation between the
states and the federal government over rights to submerged lands
was delaying the production of domestic oil. 4 A 1953 House Com-
mittee report noted:
90. The extraction of oil from Prudhoe Bay has also been the subject of much dispute.
The plan for the trans-Alaska pipeline, which will carry oil from Prudhoe Bay on the North
Slope of the state down to the port of Valdez on the southern Pacific coast of Alaska, was
attacked by environmental groups on several grounds, one of which was that the environ-
mental impact of the pipeline had not been adequately studied. Suit was brought against
the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the pipeline construction com-
pany (Alyeska), and the state of Alaska to permanently enjoin the Secretary of the Interior
from granting the permit necessary to construct the pipeline. Wilderness Society v. Mor-
ton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Judge Skelly Wright held that the Secretary of the
Interior did not have the authority to issue the land permit because it would violate section
185 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970), which placed a twenty-
five foot limit on either side of the pipeline for all construction work. As a result of this
holding, the Mineral Lands Leasing Act was amended in 1973 to allow a fifty foot right-
of-way for pipeline purposes plus a provision permitting the Secretary to widen the right-
of-way if he deems it necessary "for the operation and maintenance after construction, or
to protect the environment or public safety." 30 U.S.C. § 185(d) (Supp. I1, 1973),
amending 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). The bill amending the Act also authorized the construc-
tion of the pipeline.
91. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 671 no.
1141 (1974).
92. The areas of exploration included the North Sea, waters off Indonesia, the conti-
nental margin of west Africa, the shelf off northwest Australia, and waters off Trinidad-
Tobago. Albers, Offshore Petroleum: Its Geography and Technology, in LAW OF THE SEA:
THE EMERGING REGIME OF THE OCEANS 293 (J. Gamble & G. Pontecorvo eds. 1974).
93. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1970).
94. H.R. REP. No. 215, supra note 28, at 2-3.
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Since the court decisions in the cases involving the States of
California, Louisiana, and Texas, new development of the vast
potentialities located in these lands has been brought almost to
a complete standstill, particularly in the Gulf of Mexico. The
litigation which was the primary cause of these stoppages
threatens to further retard any progress. Therefore, the commit-
tee feels that permanent legislation covering all phases of this
litigation must be enacted. 5
The primary purpose of the Submerged Lands Act, then, was to
clarify rights to the lands under the sea so that the states and the
federal government would resume the search for oil within the
respective territories granted to each of them.
In 1947, before the passage of the Submerged Lands Act, the
Supreme Court had explicitly recognized the foreign policy needs
of the federal government when it granted rights to subsurface
resources beneath the territorial sea to the United States.
The government also appears in its capacity as a member of the
family of nations. In that capacity it is responsible for conduct-
ing United States relations with other nations. It asserts that
proper exercise of these constitutional responsibilities requires
that it have power, unencumbered by state commitments, al-
ways to determine what agreements will be made concerning the
control and use of the marginal sea and the land under it."
In 1975, the Supreme Court has used principles of interna-
tional law to allow the federal government to acquire sovereignty
over submerged lands without explicitly deferring to the wishes
of the executive.97 Three months before the decision in United
States v. Alaska, the Court decided the case of United States v.
Maine.8 It held that the United States, as against thirteen states
on the eastern seaboard, was vested with the rights over the
seabed and subsoil under the Atlantic Ocean more than three
miles from the outer limits of inland waters. As in United States
v. Alaska, the Maine Court relied upon the Submerged Lands Act
and on its own previous decisions concerning submerged lands99
95. Id. at 2.
96. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 29 (1947).
97. See Charney, Judicial Deference in the Submerged Lands Cases, 7 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 383 (1974), for an extensive discussion of all submerged lands cases decided
through 1973.
98. 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
99. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S.
699 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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in granting oil-rich lands to the federal government. Thus, while
recent Supreme Court decisions appear to minimize the wishes
of the executive and to rely upon neutral principles of interna-
tional law, the same foreign policy considerations that appeared
expressly in earlier opinions decided before the passage of the
Submerged Lands Act underlie the recent cases.
Seen in the light of the pragmatic needs of the federal govern-
ment, the decision in United States v. Alaska takes on an added
dimension. Not only does it clarify the proof required for the
determination of historic bay status, but the impact of the deci-
sion is to reaffirm the right of the United States Government to
exercise the sovereignty it deems necessary to carry out foreign
policy.
Martha J. Salper
